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Problems of allocating indivisible goods to agents in an efficient and fair manner without money have long been investigated
in the literature. The random assignment problem is one of them, where we are given a fixed feasible (available) set of indivisible
goods and a profile of ordinal preferences over the goods, one for each agent. Then, using lotteries, we determine an assignment
of goods to agents in a randomized way. A seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) shows a probabilistic serial (PS)
mechanism to give an ordinally efficient and envy-free solution to the assignment problem.
In this paper we consider an extension of the random assignment problem to submodular constraints on goods. We show
that the approach of the PS mechanism by Bogomolnaia and Moulin is powerful enough to solve the random assignment
problem with submodular (matroidal and polymatroidal) constraints. Under the agents’ ordinal preferences over goods we
show the following.
(1) The obtained PS solution for the problem with unit demands and matroidal constraints is ordinally efficient, envy-free,
and weakly strategy-proof with respect to the associated stochastic dominance relation.
(2) For the multi-unit demand and polymatroidal constraint problem the PS solution is ordinally efficient and envy-free
but is not strategy-proof in general. However, we show that under a mild condition (that is likely to be satisfied in
practice) the PS solution is a weak Nash equilibrium.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Problems of allocating indivisible goods to agents in a fair and efficient manner without money have long been
investigated in the literature (see, e.g., [1–6, 17–22, 26, 28, 31]). Suppose that we are given a fixed feasible (available)
set of indivisible goods and a profile of ordinal preferences over the goods, one for each agent. Then, using
lotteries, we determine an assignment of goods to agents in a randomized way. A seminal paper of Bogomolnaia
∗The corresponding author
S. Fujishige’s work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP25280004 and Y. Sano’s work by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers
JP15K20885, JP16H03118.
ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor, or affiliate of the United States government.
As such, the United States government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do
so, for government purposes only.
© 2017 Association for Computing Machinery.
XXXX-XXXX/2017/10-ART1 $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: October 2017.
1:2 • Satoru FUJISHIGE, Yoshio SANO, and Ping ZHAN
and Moulin [5] shows a probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism to give an ordinally efficient and envy-free solution
to the assignment problem.
In this paper we consider an extension of the random assignment problem to submodular constraints on goods
in two cases:
(1) Agents have unit demands and the family of feasible sets of goods forms a family of bases of a matroid.
(The original problem in [5] is concerned with a matroid having only one base.)
(2) Agents have multi-unit demands and the set of feasible integral vectors of goods forms an integral polyma-
troid. (A polymatroid having only one base is treated in [6, 18, 21].)
We show that the approach of the PS mechanism by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] is powerful enough to solve
the random assignment problem with submodular (matroidal and polymatroidal) constraints. Under the agents’
ordinal preferences over goods we prove the following.
(1) The obtained PS solution for the problem with unit demands and matroidal constraints is ordinally efficient,
envy-free, and weakly strategy-proof with respect to the partial order defined by the stochastic dominance
relation introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5].
(2) For the multi-unit demand and polymatroidal constraint problem the PS solution is ordinally efficient and
envy-free but is not weakly strategy-proof in general. However, under a mild condition (that is likely to be
satisfied in practice) the PS solution is a weak Nash equilibrium.
The well-known Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem on bi-stochastic matrices shows that every bi-stochastic
matrix is expressed as a convex combination of permutation matrices, which plays a crucial role in implementing
the PS mechanism developed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5]. On the other hand, our extended probabilistic serial
mechanism heavily depends on the results of submodular optimization such as the integrality of the independent
flow polyhedra ([8, 10]), which generalizes the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain how we are motivated by the seminal
paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5]. Section 3 gives some definitions and preliminaries to be used later. In
Section 4 we precisely describe the random assignment problem with submodular (polymatroidal and matroidal)
constraints. In Section 5 we show a procedure to find an extended PS solution in the convex hull of the feasible
allocations (as an expected allocation) in an ordinally efficient and fair manner. In Section 6 we examine the issue
of strategy-proofness of our solution mechanism. Section 7 shows how to design a lottery efficiently to get the
desired expected allocation given in Section 5. Section 8 gives concluding remarks.
The present paper is based on the authors’ working papers [12] and [13].
2 MOTIVATION AND EXAMPLES
In this section we explain our motivation of the present paper through a series of examples of the random
assignment problem and their extensions, which hopefully makes our paper more readable for those who are not
very familiar with matroids and polymatroids. (Precise definitions of matroid and polymatroid will be given in
Section 3.)
We are interested in obtaining a general model of the random assignment problem, fully generalized in view of
the state of the art in combinatorial optimization, to which the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin can
naturally be extended. In the history of the developments in combinatorial optimization we have a sequence of
successful generalizations of the theory of combinatorial optimization as follows (see, e.g., [10, 27]).
(1) Matchings in bipartite graphs (from around 1930s).
(2) From (1) to flows in capacitated networks (from 1950s).
(3) From (1) to matroid intersection (the intersection of two matroids) (from late 1960s).
(4) From (1), (2), and (3) to polymatroid intersection (the intersection of two polymatroids) and equivalently,
submodular flows, polymatroidal flows, and independent flows (intensively from late 1970s).
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(We should also mention other successful developments in the theory of combinatorial optimization such as
matchings in general graphs and arborescences/branchings in directed graphs, which are not related to the
motivation of our present paper.) Another important theoretical development that motivated our present research
is the theory of principal partitions [9, 11], which is closely related to convex optimization over polymatroid base
polyhedra.
When we found the seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5], we thought that the theory was at the stage
of (1) matchings in bipartite graphs and that the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism shown in [5] was closely
related to the monotone algorithm in [9] and [10, Sec. 9.2]. Hence we felt that the results in [5] could naturally be
extended to the combinatorial optimization model of (4) mentioned above. Actually, we have found that the PS
mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] is powerful enough to have natural extensions to the combinatorial
optimization model (4) of independent flows. The full extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[5] is worth investigating theoretically and it must also be useful for possible applications in the future if not at
present.
We hope that readers would duly recognize the potential applicability of our theoretical extensions in practice
through (rather toy) examples given below. The issues of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-
proofness will be examined later. (Let R be the set of reals, Z the set of integers, R≥0 the set of nonnegative
reals, Z≥0 the set of nonnegative integers, R>0 the set of positive reals, and Z>0 the set of positive integers.) In
the following we give six illustrative examples, where the last two examples, Examples 2.5 and 2.6, cannot be
modeled by using known PS extensions in the literature.
Example 2.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of three agents and suppose that there is only one good (object) e0.











Fig. 1. (a) A simple assignment problem represented by a graph and (b) a feasible {0, 1}-flow.
can be identified with a {0, 1}-valued flow φ from N to e0 of flow value 1 in the graph as in Figure 1 (b). Putting
the set of arcs of the graph as A = {(1, e0), (2, e0), (3, e0)}, the set of feasible assignments is represented by the set
of {0, 1}-valued vectors in {0, 1}A ⊂ RA as B = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}. Introducing a lottery with a probability
distribution p on B, we get an expected allocation (p1,p2,p3) with probability p1 for (1, 0, 0), p2 for (0, 1, 0), and
p3 for (0, 0, 1). The set of all expected allocations for all possible probability distributions p on B is the convex
hull of B (see Figure 2). Here we do not discuss which expected solution to choose although it is well-known that




3 ) obtained by the uniform distribution on B is the fair and strategy-proof solution.
Example 2.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and suppose that we have a set E = {a,b, c} of three goods. Each agent i ∈ N
wants to get one of E and has a preference order on E. Then any feasible allocation is a perfect matching in
the bipartite graph G = (N ,E;A) given as in Figure 3 (a). A perfect matching in G can be identified with a
{0, 1}-valued flow φ inG as in Figure 3 (b), where a flow of value 1 enters every i ∈ N and a flow of value 1 leaves
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: October 2017.








Fig. 2. The set of all expected allocations for Example 2.1.
every e ∈ E. LetM be the set of all feasible allocations, i.e., the set of all perfect matchings of G . We regard every
perfect matching in G as a {0, 1}-vector in RA. Then every lottery onM determines an expected allocation that is
a vector in the convex hull Conv(M) ofM in RA. Note that all the possible lotteries onM generate exactly the
points of the convex hull Conv(M) in RA, which is known as the Birkhoff-von Neumann polytope of bi-stochastic
matrices. Now the problem is how to determine a solution, a desired expected allocation in Conv(M) and to























Fig. 3. (a) A bipartite graph G = (N ,E;A) and (b) a perfect matching as a feasible flow in G for Example 2.2.
Example 2.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Now suppose that we have a set E = {a,b, c,d } of four goods and that because
of some budget constraint only two goods from E can be offered to the agents, while each agent wants to get one
good from E and has a preference order on E. Every feasible allocation for the present problem can be regarded
as a {0, 1}-valued flow φ of flow value two from N to E in the bipartite graph G = (N ,E;A) (given as in Figure 4)
such that a flow of value 0 or 1 enters every i ∈ N and a flow of value 0 or 1 leaves every e ∈ E. Figure 4 shows a
feasible allocation that assigns good c to agent 1 and good d to agent 2.
Here the family B of available two-element subsets of E is a typical example of a matroid base family of a
uniform matroid of rank two (the precise definition will be given later). It should also be noted that this matroidal
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: October 2017.





















Fig. 4. A feasible flow in a bipartite graph G = (N ,E;A) for Example 2.3.
constraint can be treated as a network flow model as in Figure 5, where every feasible allocation can be regarded
as a {0, 1}-valued flow φ in the graph such that a flow of value 0 or 1 enters every i ∈ N , φ satisfies the flow
conservation law at every internal vertex e ∈ E, and a flow of value two leaves the exit t , where every arc capacity


























Fig. 5. (I) A network-flow representation and a feasible flow for Example 2.3.
Example 2.4. Similarly as in Example 2.3 we may also treat, as a matroidal constraint, the case when at most
one good from {a,b}, at most one good from {c,d }, and two goods in total are available. This is a matroidal
constraint represented by the direct sum of rank-one uniform matroid on {a,b} and that on {c,d }. As can easily
be seen, this can also be formulated as a network flow model similarly as in Example 2.3 (see Figure 6). Actually
these types of constraints here and in Examples 2.3 are considered by E. Budish et al. [6] as a laminar constraint1,
which can be expressed by a directed tree from the set E of leaves toward the root (exit) t with arcs having
appropriate capacities. It should further be noted that beyond the laminar constraints represented by directed
1They call a laminar constraint a hierarchy. A family F ⊆ 2E is called laminar if for all X , Y ∈ F we have X ⊆ Y , Y ⊆ X , or X ∩ Y = ∅.
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trees as considered by Budish et al. [6], we can consider any directed network from E to exit t , which represents



























Fig. 6. (II) A network-flow representation and a feasible flow for Example 2.4.
Moreover, it should be noted that the convex hull of all the {0, 1}-valued flows is given by the set of real-valued
flows in the associated network, due to the integrality property of flows in networks with integral capacity
functions. This gives a basis for constructing a lottery to realize a desired solution.
Example 2.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and E = {a,b, c,d } as in Examples 2.3 and 2.4. Suppose that the set B of available
subsets of E is that of all two-element subsets of E but {a,b}, i.e.,
B = {X | X ⊂ E, |X | = 2, X , {a,b}}. (1)
This is a graphic matroid, which can be represented by a graph H = (V ,E) with E being the edge set as shown in




Fig. 7. A graph H = (V ,E) with edge set E = {a,b, c,d }.
We can consider any matroidal constraints on the set of available subsets of goods.
2 Budish et al. [6] considered {0, 1}-valued flows in bipartite networks with laminar constraints on both sides of vertex sets N and E (called a
bihierarchy. This model is a special case of the independent flow model with polymatroids of network type on both sets of entrances and of
exits, which will precisely be defined in Section 3.
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Example 2.6. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and E = {a,b, c,d }. Now we suppose that E is the set of types of goods and
there exist multi-units of each good e ∈ E. As an example consider a polymatroidal constraint of network type

































Fig. 8. A polymatroidal constraint of network type (an integer attached to each arc denotes the arc capacity).
integer. We suppose that each agent i ∈ N has a demand d (i ) (the total number of goods of any types) given by
d (1) = 3, d (2) = 2, and d (3) = 3 and the total amount of available goods (of any types) is equal to 7. Then every
feasible allocation corresponds to an integral flow φ in the network such that (1) the flow value entering each
i ∈ N is at most d (i ), (2) the flow value leaving the exit t is equal to 7, and (3) φ satisfies the capacity constraint of































Fig. 9. An integral flow φ in the network (an integer attached to each arc denotes the arc flow value), where agent 1 receives
two copies of good a and one copy of good c .
integral N × E matrix (φ (i, e ) | i ∈ N , e ∈ E) gives a feasible allocation. The set B of all available good vectors is
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the set of vectors x ∈ ZE≥0 defined by x (e ) =
∑
i ∈N φ (i, e ) (e ∈ E) for all feasible integral flows φ in the network.
Set B is the set of integral bases of a polymatroid of network type, represented by the subnetwork connecting
E = {a,b, c,d } with exit t . Besides such polymatroids of network type we can consider any integral polymatroidal
set (an integral base polyhedron) of available good vectors in ZE≥0.
3 DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we give definitions of some concepts from the theory of matroids and polymatroids and also give
preliminary lemmas and theorems to be used in the following (see, e.g., [10, 25, 27, 30]).
Let E be a nonempty finite set. For any subset X ⊆ E denote by χX the characteristic vector of X in RE , i.e.,
χX (e ) = 1 for e ∈ X and χX (e ) = 0 for e ∈ E \ X . We also write χe instead of χ {e } for e ∈ E.
A pair (E, ρ) of set E and a function ρ : 2E → R≥0 is called a polymatroid [7] if the following three conditions
hold (also see [10, 27, 30]).
(1) ρ (∅) = 0.
(2) For any X ,Y ∈ 2E with X ⊆ Y we have ρ (X ) ≤ ρ (Y ).
(3) For any X ,Y ∈ 2E we have ρ (X ) + ρ (Y ) ≥ ρ (X ∪ Y ) + ρ (X ∩ Y ).3
The function ρ is called the rank function of the polymatroid (E, ρ). We assume ρ (E) > 0 in the sequel.
For a given polymatroid (E, ρ), let B(ρ) (⊆ RE ) be the base polyhedron of the polymatroid (see [10]), which is
given by
B(ρ) = {x ∈ RE | ∀X ⊂ E : x (X ) ≤ ρ (X ), x (E) = ρ (E)}, (2)
where for any X ⊆ E we define x (X ) = ∑e ∈X x (e ). It should be noted that B(ρ) ⊆ RE≥0. Moreover, we have the
following relation between the rank function ρ and the base polyhedron B(ρ).
ρ (X ) = max{x (X ) | x ∈ B(ρ)} (∀X ⊆ E). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) determine a one-to-one correspondence between the set of rank functions ρ : 2E → R and
the set of base polyhedra B(ρ) ⊂ RE . It should be noted that the concept of the base polyhedron of a polymatroid
is equivalent to that of the core of a convex game due to Shapley [29].
Also consider the lower hereditary closure of the base polyhedron B(ρ) given by
P(ρ) = {x ∈ RE | ∀X ⊆ E : x (X ) ≤ ρ (X )}, (4)
which is called the submodular polyhedron associated with polymatroid (E, ρ). The polytope P(+) (ρ) ≡ P(ρ) ∩RE≥0
is called the independence polytope of polymatroid (E, ρ) and each vector in P(+) (ρ) is called an independent vector.
Note that relation (3) holds when we replace B(ρ) by P(ρ) (respectively, P(+) (ρ)) in (3), as well, and P(ρ) uniquely
determines the rank function ρ : 2E → R (see Figure 10).
Given a vector x ∈ P(ρ), a subset X of E is called tight for x (or x-tight for short) if we have x (X ) = ρ (X ), and
there exists a unique maximal x-tight set, denoted by sat(x ), which is equal to the union of all tight sets for x . We
also have
sat(x ) = {e ∈ E | ∀α > 0 : x + α χe < P(ρ)}, (5)
which is the set of elements e ∈ E for which we cannot increase x (e ) without leaving P(ρ). Moreover, for x ∈ P(ρ)
and e ∈ sat(x ) define
dep(x , e ) = {e ′ ∈ E | ∃α > 0 : x + α (χe − χe ′ ) ∈ P(ρ)}. (6)
The following fact is fundamental in the theory of polymatroids and submodular functions.
3A set function satisfying these inequalities is called a submodular function and the negative of a submodular function is called a supermodular
function. A function that is submodular and at the same time supermodular is called a modular function.
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Fig. 10. Base polyhedra B(ρ) and submodular polyhedra P(ρ).
Lemma 3.1. Given anyx ∈ P(ρ) andX ,Y ⊆ E, if we havex (X ) = ρ (X ) andx (Y ) = ρ (Y ), thenx (X∪Y ) = ρ (X∪Y )
and x (X ∩ Y ) = ρ (X ∩ Y ). That is, the set of x-tight sets is closed with respect to the set union and intersection.
Because of this fact sat(x ) for x ∈ P(ρ) is the unique maximal x-tight set and dep(x , e ) for e ∈ sat(x ) is the
unique minimal x-tight set that includes e . (See [10] for more details about these concepts and related facts.)
If the rank function ρ of a polymatroid (E, ρ) is integer-valued and satisfies ρ ({e}) ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E, then (E, ρ)
is called a matroid (see, e.g., [25, 30]). When (E, ρ) is a matroid, define
I = {X ⊆ E | |X | = ρ (X )}, B = {X ∈ I | |X | = ρ (E)}. (7)
Each I ∈ I is called an independent set and I is the family of independent sets of (E, ρ). Each B ∈ B is called a
base and B is called the family of bases and consists of all maximal independent sets of (E, ρ) (maximal with
respect to set inclusion). Since each of ρ, B and I uniquely determines the matroid on E, we also denote by
(E,B) (or (E,I)) the matroid (E, ρ).
For any polymatroid (E, ρ) with an integer-valued rank function ρ define
BZ (ρ) = B(ρ) ∩ ZE , PZ (ρ) = P(ρ) ∩ ZE . (8)
The following is well known (see, e.g., [10]).
Theorem 3.2. When (E, ρ) is a polymatroid with an integer-valued rank function ρ, B(ρ) (resp. P(ρ)) is the
convex hull of BZ (ρ) (resp. PZ (ρ)). Moreover, when (E, ρ) is a matroid, BZ (ρ) (or P(+) (ρ) ∩ ZE ) is exactly the set of
all the characteristic vectors of bases (or independent sets) of matroid (E, ρ).
For a polymatroid (E, ρ) and a nonempty subset F ⊆ E define ρF : 2F → R by ρF (X ) = ρ (X ) for all X ⊆ F .
Then we have a polymatroid (F , ρF ), which is called a reduction of (E, ρ) by F (or restriction of (E, ρ) to F ).
Moreover, define ρF : 2E\F → R by ρF (X ) = ρ (F ∪X ) − ρ (F ) for all X ⊆ E \ F . Then (E \ F , ρF ) is a polymatroid,
called a contraction of (E, ρ) by F . For any nonempty F1, F2 ⊆ E with F1 ⊂ F2 we put ρF2F1 = (ρF2 )F1 , which defines
a polymatroid (F2 \ F1, ρF2F1 ), called a minor of (E, ρ).
For any vector x ∈ RE and any nonempty set A ⊆ E define xA ∈ RA by xA (e ) = x (e ) for all e ∈ A. We have the
following lemma, which will be used in Section 6.1.1.
Lemma 3.3. Let P = (E, ρ) be a polymatroid. For any vectors x ,y ∈ P(ρ) satisfying x (e ) ≥ y (e ) (∀e ∈ E \ sat(x )),
we have sat(x ) ⊇ sat(y).
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(Proof) Suppose that we are given vectors x ,y ∈ P(ρ) satisfying x (e ) ≥ y (e ) (∀e ∈ E \ sat(x )). Increase the values
of y (e ) for all e ∈ sat(x ) as much as possible while keeping the vector within P(ρ), and let us denote by y ′ the
resulting vector in P(ρ). Then, we have sat(y ′) ⊇ sat(x ). LettingA = sat(x ) and B = sat(y ′), if ρ (A) > y ′(A), then
ρ (B) − ρ (A) < y ′(B) − y ′(A) ≤ x (B) − x (A).
Since ρ (A) = x (A), this implies ρ (B) < x (B), a contradiction. Hence ρ (A) = y ′(A) and (y ′)A and xA are bases of
P ·A = (A, ρA), the restriction of P to A. Hence (y ′)E\A ∈ P(ρA), where ρA is the rank function of the contraction
(E \A, ρA) of P by A. Since x (e ) ≥ y ′(e ) (∀e ∈ E \A) and sat(x ) = A, we have sat(y) ⊆ sat(y ′) ⊆ sat(x ) = A. □
Simple examples of polymatroids, some of which has already appeared in Section 2, are given as follows.
Uniform matroids: For a positive integer k ≤ m(= |E |) every subset of cardinality k of E is exactly a base, i.e.,
B = {X | X ⊆ E, |X | = k }.
When k =m(= |E |), B consists of only one base E, which is the unique available set of goods as considered in
the literature for the ordinary random assignment problem.
Graphic matroids: For a connected graph G = (V ,E) with a vertex set V and an edge set E every edge subset
that forms a spanning tree ofG is exactly a base, i.e., (E,B) is the graphic matroid represented by graphG = (V ,E)
with B being the family of edge sets of spanning trees. Note that for any X ⊆ E the value of ρ (X ) is equal to the
maximum size of cycle-free subsets of X in G.
Symmetric polymatroids: Letд : R→ R be a nondecreasing concave function withд(0) = 0. Define ρ : 2E → R
by ρ (X ) = д( |X |). Then (E, ρ) is a polymatroid. Note that the concavity of д corresponds to the law of diminishing
marginal utility in economics.
Linear polymatroids: Let V be a vector space. Let E be a nonempty finite set and for each e ∈ E let Fe be a
finite set of vectors inV . Define ρ : 2E → R by ρ (X ) = rank(⋃e ∈X Fe ) for all X ⊆ E. Then (E, ρ) is a polymatroid
with the integer-valued rank function ρ.
Polymatroids ofmulti-terminal networkflows ([23],[10, Sec 2.2]; also see [9, 15]): LetN = (G = (V ,A), s,T , c )
be a network, where G = (V ,A) is a graph with a vertex set V and an arc set A, s ∈ V is a source, T ⊂ V \ {s} is a
set of sink terminals, and c : A→ R>0 is a capacity function of the network. We suppose that there exists no arc
leaving T . A function φ : A→ R≥0 is called a feasible flow in N if it satisfies the capacity constraints
0 ≤ φ (a) ≤ c (a) (∀a ∈ A) (9)
and the flow conservation constraints
∂φ (v ) = 0 (∀v ∈ V \ ({s} ∪T )), (10)
where the boundary ∂φ : V → R of flow φ is defined by
∂φ (v ) =
∑
(v,w )∈A
φ (v,w ) −
∑
(w,v )∈A
φ (w,v ) (∀v ∈ V ). (11)
Also define the out-flow ∂−φ : T → R≥0 of φ by
∂−φ (v ) =
∑
(w,v )∈A
φ (w,v ) (= −∂φ (v )) (∀v ∈ T ). (12)
Then the set of out-flows ∂−φ ∈ RT≥0 of all feasible flows φ in N is the independence polytope, in RT≥0, of a
polymatroid (T , ρ) on T . For any X ⊆ T the value of rank ρ (X ) is equal to the maximum flow value from s to X
in N . (It should be noted that polymatroids of network type have appeared in Examples 2.3–2.6 in Section 2,
where arcs of the representing networks are reoriented.)
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When the underlying graph G = (V ,A) is a star such that V = {s} ∪ T and A = {(s, t ) | t ∈ T }, we have a
polymatroid on T with a modular rank function ρ such that ρ (X ) = ∑v ∈X c (s,v ) for all X ⊆ T . Any polymatroid
of this kind has a unique base and vice versa.
Consider a capacitated network N = (G = (V ,A), S+, S−, c, (S+, ρ+), (S−, ρ−)) with polymatroids on sets
S+, S− ⊂ V . Here G is the underlying graph with vertex set V and arc set A, and S+ and S− are disjoint subsets of
V and are, respectively, the set of sources (entrances) and that of sinks (exits). Furthermore, we have a capacity
function c : A → R≥0 and a pair of polymatroids (S+, ρ+) and (S−, ρ−). A function φ : A → R is called an
independent flow in N if it satisfies
0 ≤ φ (a) ≤ c (a) (∀a ∈ A), (13)
∂φ (v ) = 0 (∀v ∈ V \ (S+ ∪ S−)), (14)
∂+φ ∈ P(+) (ρ+), ∂−φ ∈ P(+) (ρ−), (15)
where ∂±φ : S± → R are defined by ∂+φ (v ) = ∂φ (v ) for all v ∈ S+ and ∂−φ (v ) = −∂φ (v ) for all v ∈ S−. Note
that (13) is the flow capacity constraint for each arc, (14) the flow conservation constraint on each internal
vertex, and (15) the polymatroidal boundary constraints on the entrance set S+ and the exit set S−. The value
∂+φ (S+) (= ∂−φ (S−)) is called the flow value (or simply value) of the independent flow φ. We may also consider a
cost function γ : A→ R, which gives a problem of finding a minimum-cost independent flow in N . This is called
the independent flow problem [8] and is equivalent to what is called the submodular flow problem (see [10]).
We have the following integrality theorem ([8, 10]), which plays a crucial role in validating our approach based
on the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5].
Theorem 3.4. Let P∗ ⊂ RA be the set of all independent flows φ in network N = (G = (V ,A), S+, S−, c, (S+, ρ+),
(S−, ρ−)). If c and ρ± are integer-valued, then P∗ is an integral polytope, i.e., P∗ is a convex polytope such that every
extreme point of P∗ is an integral vector. Moreover, the same integrality property also holds if we consider the set of
independent flows of fixed integral value ∂+φ (S+) (= ∂−φ (S−)).
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
Now we give a precise definition of the random assignment problem with polymatroidal constraints and later
examine the problem with matroidal constraints as a special case.
4.1 Model description
Let N = {1, 2, · · · ,n} be a set of agents and E be a set of goods. Each good e ∈ E should be considered as a type
of good and the number of available good e can be more than one (see Example 2.6). Each agent i ∈ N wants to
obtain a certain amount of goods of any types, denoted by d (i ) ∈ Z>0, at most in total. We refer to d (i ) as the
demand upper bound of agent i . The vector d = (d (i ) | i ∈ N ) ∈ ZN>0 is called the demand vector. For each i ∈ N
and e ∈ E let x i (e ) be the number of copies of good e that agent i obtains. Then we must have
x i (E) ≡
∑
e ∈E
x i (e ) ≤ d (i ) (16)
for every agent i ∈ N . Let B ⊆ ZE≥0 be the set of all available vectors of goods in the market that is given by
B = BZ (ρ) for a polymatroid (E, ρ) with an integer-valued rank function ρ (see (8)). Since the sum of vectors∑
i ∈N x i must be available in the market, we have the following constraint.∑
i ∈N
x i ∈ BZ (ρ). (17)
We assume that ρ (E) ≤ d (N ).
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Define A ⊆ ZN×E≥0 to be the set of all functions φ : N ×E → Z≥0 such that vectors given by x i = (φ (i, e ) | e ∈ E)
for all i ∈ N satisfy (16) and (17). Every φ ∈ A determines a feasible allocation x i = (φ (i, e ) | e ∈ E) for each
agent i ∈ N . Note that a function φ : N × E → Z≥0 is identified with an N × E matrix P = (φ (i, e ) | i ∈ N , e ∈ E),
and x i is with the ith row of P for each i ∈ N .
Consider an independent-flow network N = (G = (S+, S−;A), c, (S+, ρ+), (S−, ρ−)), where S+ = N , S− = E,
G = (S+, S−;A) is a complete bipartite graph with vertex bi-partition (S+, S−) and arc set A = S+ × S−, c (a) = +∞
(a sufficiently large positive integer) for all a ∈ A, (S−, ρ−) is an integral polymatroid with rank function ρ− = ρ
appearing in (17), and (S+, ρ+) is a polymatroid with a (modular) rank function ρ+ given by ρ+ (X ) = d (X ) for all
X ⊆ S+ = N .4 For simplicity we also denote the present independent-flow network by N = (N ,E,d, (E, ρ)) (see
Figure 11). Then from Theorem 3.2 we can easily see the following.
Lemma 4.1. The set A is exactly the set of integer-valued independent flows φ : S+ × S− → Z≥0 of value
∂+φ (N ) = ∂−φ (E) = ρ (E) in network N = (N ,E,d, (E, ρ)).












Fig. 11. An independent-flow network N .
Because of Theorem 3.4 and Lemma 4.1 we also have the following.
Corollary 4.2. The set of all (real-valued) independent flows φ of value ρ (E) in N = (N ,E,d, (E, ρ)) is the
convex hull Conv(A) of all integer-valued independent flows of value ρ (E) in N .
4.2 Ordinal preference and stochastic dominance relation
We suppose that each agent i ∈ N has an ordinal preference ≻i over set E of types of goods5, which is a linear
ordering of E. Let agent i’s preference be given by
Li : ei1 ≻i ei2 ≻i · · · ≻i eim , (18)
4 We may be tempted to consider a general polymatroid as (S+, ρ+) on the set S+ = N of agents instead of a modular rank function ρ+.
Though the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin can formally be extended to such a general model mathematically, we cannot adapt
our arguments to validate the assertions given in the sequel, especialy in Section 6. However, because of Theorem 3.2 the procedure shown in
Section 7 for designing a lottery to realize any given expected allocation can be adapted even for such a general model (cf. the model with a
bihierarchy structure in [6]).
5We often call a type of good e ∈ E as a good e in the sequel, where there is no possibility of confusion.
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where {ei1, ei2, · · · , eim } = E6 and ei1 is the most favorite (type of) good for agent i . LetL be the profile of preferences
Li (i ∈ N ).
Since we must make a decision on how to allocate goods in a fair manner without money, we may consider a
lottery, which is represented by a probability distribution p over A, i.e., p : A→ R≥0 satisfying ∑φ ∈A p (φ) = 1.





where precisely speaking, the left-hand side is the expectation of a random variable φ with its probability
distribution p on A while φ appearing on the right-hand side is a variable taking on values of A. It should be
noted that the set of all expected allocations E{φ} of (19) for all possible probability distributions p is exactly the
convex hull Conv(A) of A and that every lottery picks up a point from among Conv(A).
In the following we use N × E matrices P to express expected allocations φ ∈ Conv(A) by identifying φ with
P = (φ (i, e ) | i ∈ N , e ∈ E), which is often employed in the literature. So we may write P ∈ Conv(A), for example.
When φ corresponds to P , φ is sometimes written as φP .
An efficient and fair expected allocation will be found with respect to the stochastic dominance relation (sd-
dominance relation for short) ⪰sdi for each agent i ∈ N on expected allocations defined as follows. Recall that we
are given a preference profile L = (Li | i ∈ N ) of (18). For any P ,Q ∈ Conv(A), putting Pi = (P (i, e ) | e ∈ E) and
Qi = (Q (i, e ) | e ∈ E) for all i ∈ N , we define
Pi ⪰sdi Qi ⇐⇒ ∀ℓ ∈ {1, · · · ,m} :
ℓ∑
k=1
P (i, eik ) ≥
ℓ∑
k=1
Q (i, eik ). (20)
We say an expected allocation P is sd-dominated byQ if we haveQi ⪰sdi Pi for all i ∈ N and P , Q . We say that P
is ordinally efficient if P is not sd-dominated by any other expected allocation in Conv(A) (cf. [5]).
Also, we say an expected allocation P is normalized envy-free ([18]) with respect to preference profile L =






Pj (∀i, j ∈ N ), (21)
where d (i ) is the integral demand upper bound of agent i ∈ N .
4.3 Lottery
When designing a lottery to pick up a solution (a desired expected allocation), it is crucial to see that we have
the integrality property of Conv(A) due to Corollary 4.2. Hence, given any (desired) expected allocation E{φ} in
Conv(A), we need at most |N | × |E | (extreme) points in A that has positive probabilities of occurrence because of
Carathéodory’s theorem on convex polytopes in order to realize a lottery that gives the expected allocation E{φ}.
Consequently, our problem becomes the following two:
(1) Find a point φ¯ (= E{φ}) from among the polytope Conv(A) in an ordinally efficient and fair manner
according to the preference profile L = (Li | i ∈ N ).
(2) Construct a lottery by finding a representation of φ¯ as a convex combination of integral points of polytope
Conv(A). The coefficients of the convex combination provide us with positive probabilities of a probability
distribution over A that leads us to φ¯ = E{φ} in (19).
6We have assumed that the preference is strict and complete, i.e.,m = |E |. This makes the arguments required in the sequel easier. When
we allow indifference among types of goods, we can extend the result of Katta and Sethuraman [20] to our problem setting, which will be
discussed elsewhere (see [14]).
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It heavily depends on the structure of the set A of feasible allocations whether we can find a desired expected
solution φ¯ and construct a lottery to realize φ¯ in a computationally efficient way. Fortunately, it follows from
Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 4.2 that A is the independent flow polytope and has a nice combinatorial structure as
shown in the literature (see, e.g., [10]). We will see that the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism by Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [5] works surprisingly well for these general problem settings with submodular constraints.
4.4 Brief historical remarks
The problem considered here includes the following as special cases.
(a) The ordinary random assignment problem considered in the literature is mostly the case where d = 1 ∈ ZN>0
and B = {1} ⊆ ZE>0 (e.g., [4, 5, 20]). Here 1 denotes a vector of all ones of appropriate dimension (determined
by the context).
(b) Kojima [21], Aziz [2], and Heo [18] considered a multi-unit demand case where d ∈ ZN>0 and B = {b} ⊆ ZE>0
for some b ∈ ZE>0.
Note that when B is a singleton set as in (a) and (b) above, the underlying (poly)matroid (E, ρ) has the unique
base and the rank function ρ is modular.
5 FINDING AN ORDINALLY EFFICIENT AND FAIR EXPECTED ALLOCATION
We first show a procedure, Algorithm 1, which is an extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[5] and will then show that the computed point in Conv(A) is an ordinally efficient and fair expected allocation.





Recall that for each i ∈ N agent i’s preference is given by (18), where {ei1, ei2, · · · , eim } = E and ei1 is the most
favorite (type of) good for agent i , andL is the profile of preferences Li (i ∈ N ). Based on the collection (a multiset)




d (i )χe i1 , (23)
where we may have ei1 = e
j
1 for distinct i, j ∈ N and d (i ) is the integral demand upper bound of agent i ∈ N .
We also denote the random assignment problem by RA = (N ,E,L = (Li | i ∈ N ),d = (d (i ) | i ∈ N ), (E, ρ)).
During the execution of the following algorithm the current preference lists Li may get shorter because of
removal of exhausted (or saturated) types of goods. Also note that Sp is the set of types of goods saturated at
stage p.
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Algorithm 1: Extended PS Solution7
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Input: A random assignment problem RA = (N ,E,L,d, (E, ρ)).
Output: An expected allocation P : N × E → R≥0.
Step 0: For each i ∈ N put x i ← 0 ∈ RE (the zero vector), and x∗ ← 0 ∈ RE .
Put S0 ← ∅, p ← 1, and λ0 ← 0.
Step 1: For current (updated) L = (Li | i ∈ N ), using b (L) in (23), compute
λp = max{t ≥ λp−1 | x∗ + (t − λp−1)b (L) ∈ P(ρ)}. (24)
7Katta and Sethuramann [20] used the term, extended PS, and we also adopt the same term, hoping no confusion.
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For each i ∈ N put x i ← x i + (λp − λp−1)d (i )χe i1 .
Put x∗ ← x∗ + (λp − λp−1)b (L) and Sp ← sat(x∗).
Step 2: Put Tp ← Sp \ Sp−1.
Update Li (i ∈ N ) by removing all elements of Tp from current Li (i ∈ N ).
Step 3: If ρ (Sp ) < ρ (E), then put p ← p + 1 and go to Step 1.
Otherwise (ρ (Sp ) = ρ (E)) put P (i, e ) ← x i (e ) for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
Return P .
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
As in [5], the parameter t in (24) can be considered as time and each agent i ∈ N eats the current top good ei1 at
rate d (i ) per unit time.
5.1 Examples
To see the behavior of Algorithm 1 let us consider two illustrative examples given as follows.
Example I (A graphic matroidal constraint and unit demands): Let us consider a family B of feasible sets given
by
B = {X | X ⊂ E, |X | = 2, X , {a,b}}. (25)
This is a graphic matroid and B is the family of edge subsets of spanning trees of the graph shown as Figure 7 in
Example 2.5.
Suppose that preferences of all agents are given as follows.
i ∈ N preference Li
1 a ≻1 b ≻1 c ≻1 d
2 a ≻2 c ≻2 b ≻2 d
3 a ≻3 c ≻3 d ≻3 b
4 b ≻4 a ≻4 d ≻4 c
Also suppose that every agent has a unit demand, i.e., d = 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) ∈ ZN . Then by Algorithm 1 we get
P =
*....,
a b c d
1 1/4 0 1/4 0
2 1/4 0 1/4 0
3 1/4 0 1/4 0





( a b c d
1 + 1 + 1, 1, 0, 0
)
, S1 = {a,b}, λ1 = 1/4 for p = 1
and
b (L) = (0, 0, 1 + 1 + 1, 1), S2 = {a,b, c,d }, λ2 = λ1 + 1/4 for p = 2,
and each row sum of P is equal to 1/4+ 1/4 = 1/2. Here, recall that Sp is the set of saturated (or exhausted) goods
after the pth execution of Step 1 of Algorithm 1. Also, vectors x∗λp on Tp = Sp \ Sp−1 for p = 1, 2 are given by
T1 = {a,b}, T2 = {c,d },
x∗λ1 (a) = 3/4, x
∗
λ1 (b) = 1/4, x
∗
λ2 (c ) = 3/4, x
∗
λ2 (d ) = 1/4.
Hence x∗P = (3/4, 1/4, 3/4, 1/4).
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: October 2017.
1:16 • Satoru FUJISHIGE, Yoshio SANO, and Ping ZHAN
The following example has a polymatroidal constraint and multi-unit demands and supplies.
Example II: Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and E = {a,b, c,d } again. Let (E, ρ) be a polymatroid with a rank function
given by
ρ (X ) =
{
4|X | if |X | ≤ 2
8 if |X | > 2 (∀X ⊆ E). (26)
Note that (E, ρ) here is a symmetric polymatroid. Suppose that preferences of all agents are the same as Example I
but E = {a,b, c,d } should be regarded as a set of types of goods. Let a demand vector be given by d = (4, 2, 1, 1) ∈
ZN . Then by Algorithm 1 we have P ∈ RN×E≥0 , as an N × E matrix, given as follows.
P =
*....,
a b c d
1 16/7 12/7 0 0
2 8/7 0 6/7 0
3 4/7 0 3/7 0





( a b c d
4 + 2 + 1, 1, 0, 0
)
, S1 = {a}, λ1 = 4/7 for p = 1
and
b (L) = (0, 4 + 1, 2 + 1, 0), S2 = {a,b, c,d }, λ2 = λ1 + 3/7 for p = 2
to get the expected allocation P given above. Also, vectors x∗λp , which are the restriction of x
∗
P on Tp = Sp \ Sp−1
for p = 1, 2, are given by
T1 = {a}, T2 = {b, c,d },
x∗λ1 (a) = 4, x
∗
λ2 (b) = 19/7, x
∗
λ2 (c ) = 9/7, x
∗
λ2 (d ) = 0.
Hence x∗P = (4, 19/7, 9/7, 0). Note that ∅, {a}, {a,b, c}, and {a,b, c,d }(= sat(x∗P )) are tight sets for x∗P .
5.2 Ordinal efficiency
The following theorem can be shown in a very similar way as the corresponding one in [5]. However, it can be
seen that the given proof heavily depends on the underlying submodularity structure, especially the one used for
the arguments in [9].
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 1 computes an expected allocation in Conv(A) that is ordinally efficient.
(Proof) By Algorithm 1 we get an expected allocation P in Conv(A) together with a chain S0 = ∅ ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂
Sp = E. Let Q be an arbitrary expected allocation in Conv(A) and suppose that Q = P or Q sd-dominates P . It
suffices to prove Q = P .
At the qth execution of Step 1 of Algorithm 1 define
Fq = {i ∈ N | ei1 ∈ Tq }. (27)
Let us denote ei1 (the top element in current Li ) at the qth execution of Step 1 by ei1 (q) and suppose that for some
integer q∗ ≥ 1 we have
Q (i, ei1 (q)) = P (i, e
i
1 (q)) (∀q = 1, · · · ,q∗ − 1, ∀i ∈ Fq ) (28)
and we execute the q∗th Step 1. Then, because of Step 1 of Algorithm 1 we have∑
i ∈Fq
P (i, ei1 (q)) = ρ (Sq ) − ρ (Sq−1) (q = 1, · · · ,q∗). (29)
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Since Q = P or Q sd-dominates P , it follows from (28) that Q (i, ei1 (q∗)) ≥ P (i, ei1 (q∗)) for all i ∈ Fq∗ . Hence from
(28) and (29) we must have
Q (i, ei1 (q
∗)) = P (i, ei1 (q
∗)) (∀i ∈ Fq∗ ), (30)





Q (i, ei1 (q)) ≤ ρ (Sq∗ ). (31)
Now, note that when q∗ = 1, Equation (28) is void (and thus holds). Hence, by induction on q = 1, · · · ,p, we have
shown Q = P . □
5.3 Envy-freeness
Recall the definition of normalized envy-freeness given in Section 4.2. We have the following theorem on
normalized envy-freeness of the extended PS mechanism. The proof is actually a direct adaptation of the one
given by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] and Schulman and Vazirani [28] for existing problem settings (also see
[18]). It should be noted that by Algorithm 1 every agent i ∈ N eats d (i ) units of goods per unit time, which is
equivalent to considering d (i ) copies of every agent i ∈ N such that each copy of agent i has the same preference
as agent i but has a unit demand.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 1 computes an expected allocation P that is normalized envy-free.

















P (i, eiℓ ). (33)
When good eik is removed after an execution of Step 1, all goods e
i
ℓ
(ℓ = 1, · · · ,k ) have been removed from E. It
follows that for all j ∈ N the time spent by agent j to eat ei
ℓ
(ℓ = 1, · · · ,k ) given by the sum of possible values
1
d (j )P (j, e
i
ℓ
) for goods ei
ℓ






P (j, eiℓ ) (∀j ∈ N ). (34)
□
6 STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
It is known that the extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin to the case of multi-unit demands
cannot be weakly strategy-proof in general ([3, 6, 18, 21]). Therefore, our polymatroidal extension is not weakly
strategy-proof in general either.8
Note that a mechanismM is weakly strategy-proof if for every input preference profile L the mechanismM
gives a solution (an expected allocation) P such that for each agent i ∈ N every misreport of agent i’s preference
8Schulman and Vazirani [28] showed strategy-proofness of the PS mechanism under lexicographic preferences. It is left for future research to
examine how their results can be adapted to our problem settings.
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results in a solution Q satisfying that Qi does not sd-dominate Pi for i . Here the strategy-proofness is concerned
with the mechanism.
6.1 Weak Nash equilibria
Let us consider the concept of a weak Nash equilibrium, which is a property of the obtained solution. For a given
input profile we say that the solution P obtained by the mechanismM is a weak Nash equilibrium if for each agent
i ∈ N every misreport of agent i’s preference results in a solution Q satisfying that Qi does not sd-dominate Pi
for i . That is, for a weak Nash equilibrium P no agent i can improve her expected allocation Pi with respect to
the sd-dominance relation by any misreport of her preference Li .
We examine our polymatroidal extension and give a certain sufficient condition9 for our solution to be a weak
Nash equilibrium. The result, Theorem 6.3, given below seems to be new even for the ordinary multi-unit demand
case where the base polyhedron consists of a single base, i.e., B(ρ) = {b} for some b ∈ ZE>0. In Section 6.2 we also
prove the weak strategy-proofness in the special case of unit demands and matroidal supplies (shown in [13]).
6.1.1 Lemmas. We first prepare two lemmas to prove Theorem 6.3 concerned with a condition for our solution
to be a weak Nash equilibrium.
Let us consider the ‘eating process’ (due to Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5]). By Algorithm 1 we have critical times
λ0 = 0 < λ1 < · · · < λq = ρ (E)/d (N )
computed by (24), where d (N ) = ∑i ∈N d (i ). At each critical time λk > 0, L is updated by removing all the
saturated types of goods from L.
For each time t with λk ≤ t ≤ λk+1 for k ∈ {0, · · · ,q − 1} we put
x∗t = x∗λk + (t − λk )b (Lt ),
where Lt = (Lit | i ∈ N ) denotes the current L = (Li | i ∈ N ) at time t and
b (Lt ) =
∑
i ∈N
d (i )χe i1
with ei1 being the top element (type of good) of current Lit . We put x∗0 = 0. Note that we have
sat(x∗t ) = sat(x∗λk ) (∀t ∈ [λk , λk+1), ∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,q − 1}).
Now, suppose that agent 1 ∈ N has a preference list L1 and misreports her preference as L¯1. Put L¯ = (L¯i | i ∈ N )
with L¯i = Li for i ∈ N \ {1}. For any original object p (a parameter, a vector, etc.) defined under preference profile
L, let us denote by p¯ the object p defined under misreported preference profile L¯.
For each e ∈ E define NP (e ) = {i ∈ N | P (i, e ) > 0}. For each e ∈ E let t (e ) be the time when good e is
exhausted (or saturated). Also for each e ∈ E and i ∈ NP (e ) let t i0 (e ) be the time when agent i starts eating good e
(or the time when e becomes the top element of current Li ).
Lemma 6.1. Let L1 and L¯1 be given by
L1 : w1 ≻ · · · ≻ ws ≻ a ≻ · · · , (35)
L¯1 : w1 ≻ · · · ≻ ws ≻ z1 ≻ · · · ≻ zs ′ ≻ a ≻ · · · (36)
with P (1,a) > 0 for some integers s ≥ 0 and s ′ ≥ 1. Suppose that t¯ (a) > t (a). Then, the following three statements
hold during the execution of Algorithm 1 with current time t < t (a).
(a) For each i ∈ N \ {1} we have ei1 ⪰i e¯i1, where ei1 and e¯i1 are the top elements of current Lit for Lt and current L¯it
for L¯t , respectively, and ⪰i is the order of original Li .
9The condition is very likely to hold for practical problems with a large number of agents.
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(b) For each e ∈ E \ (sat(x¯∗t ) ∪ {a}) we have x∗t (e ) ≤ x¯∗t (e ).
(c) sat(x∗t ) ⊆ sat(x¯∗t ).
Moreover, we have
(d) t¯ i0 (a) ≤ t i0 (a) (∀i ∈ NP (a) \ {1}).
(Proof) We can easily see from Algorithm 1 and the definition of L and L¯ that (a) implies
b (L¯t ) (e ) ≥ b (Lt ) (e ) (∀t ∈ [0, t (a)), ∀e ∈ E \ (sat(x¯∗t ) ∪ {a})),
which implies (b). Moreover, (c) follows from (b) and Lemma 3.3, where we restrict the ground set of polymatroid
(E, ρ) to E \ {a} since a is not saturated for both x∗t and x¯∗t for t < t (a) by the assumption. Also (d) easily follows
from (a) (for all t ∈ [0, t (a))).
Hence it suffices to show that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, t (a)), by induction on the indices k of critical times λk
and λ¯k . First, note that (a) holds for t ∈ [0,min{λ1, λ¯1, t (a)}) since ei1 = e¯i1 for all i ∈ N \ {1}.
We consider the following three cases (A), (B), and (C).
(A) Suppose that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, λk ) for some k ≥ 1 with λk < t (a) and that λk is not equal to any
critical time for L¯, i.e., λ¯p < λk < λ¯p+1 for some p. Then it follows from Lemma 3.3 that at time t = λk , if ei1 for
i ∈ N \ {1} becomes saturated, then ei1 belongs to sat(x¯∗t ) and the new (non-saturated) ei1 satisfies ei1 ⪰i e¯i1. (Here
we employ Lemma 3.3 by restricting the polymatroid to E \ {a} since a is not saturated for x∗t with t < t (a).)
Hence (a) holds for t = λk and then so does for all t ∈ [0,min{λk+1, λ¯p+1, t (a)}).
(B) Suppose that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, λ¯k ) for some k ≥ 1 with λ¯k < t (a) and that λp < λ¯k < λp+1 for some p.
Then at time t = λ¯k we have sat(x¯∗t ) enlarged and newly saturated e¯i1 is replaced by the next non-saturated one
in L¯it , current L¯i . Hence (a) holds for t = λ¯k and then so does for all t ∈ [0,min{λp+1, λ¯k+1, t (a)}).
(C) Suppose that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, λk ) for some k ≥ 1 with λk < t (a) and that λk = λ¯p for some p ≥ 1.
Then at time t = λ¯p (= λk ) we have sat(x¯∗t ) enlarged and newly saturated e¯i1 is replaced by the next non-saturated
one in L¯it . Also, at time t = λk (= λ¯p ), if ei1 becomes saturated, then ei1 belongs to updated sat(x¯∗t ) and the new
non-saturated ei1 satisfies ei1 ⪰i e¯i1 for possibly new non-saturated e¯i1 (due to Lemma 3.3). Hence (a) holds for
t = λk (= λ¯p ) and then so does for all t ∈ [0,min{λk+1, λ¯p+1, t (a)}).
This completes the proof of the present lemma by induction. □
Lemma 6.2. Under the same assumption as in Lemma 6.1, we have
x∗t (a) (a) ≥ x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a). (37)
(Proof) Suppose that t¯ (a) > t (a) and let p and q be integers such that λ¯p < t (a) ≤ λ¯p+1 and λq = t (a). It follows
from Lemma 6.1 that for all t ∈ [λ¯p , t (a))
sat(x∗t ) ⊆ sat(x¯∗t ), x∗t (e ) ≤ x¯∗t (e ) (∀e ∈ E \ (sat(x¯∗t ) ∪ {a})). (38)
Also we see from Lemma 6.1 and the continuity of x∗t in t that at t = t (a) we have
x∗t (a) (e ) ≤ x¯∗t (a) (e ) (∀e ∈ E \ (sat(x¯∗t (a) ) ∪ {a})). (39)
Define y¯ϵ = x¯ ∗¯t (a)−ϵ for any ϵ with 0 < ϵ ≤ t¯ (a). Then, for a sufficiently small ϵ > 0 we have a < sat(y¯ϵ ) and
x¯∗t (a) (e ) = y¯ϵ (e ) (∀e ∈ sat(x¯∗t (a) )), (40)
x¯∗t (a) (e ) ≤ y¯ϵ (e ) (∀e ∈ E \ sat(x¯∗t (a) )). (41)
Increase the values of x∗t (a) (e ) for all e ∈ sat(y¯ϵ ) as much as possible while keeping the vector within P(ρ). Let y∗
be the resulting independent vector. Then we have
sat(y∗) ⊇ sat(y¯ϵ ) ∪ {a}. (42)
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Put A = sat(y∗) and B = sat(y¯ϵ ). Then,
x∗t (a) (A) − x∗t (a) (B) = y∗ (A) − y∗ (B) ≥ ρ (A) − ρ (B) > y¯ϵ (A) − y¯ϵ (B), (43)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that a ∈ A and a < sat(y¯ϵ ). Hence from (39)–(43) we have
x∗t (a) (a) > y¯ϵ (a) = x¯
∗¯
t (a)−ϵ (a). (44)
Since (44) holds for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0 and x¯∗t is continuous in t , we have x∗t (a) (a) ≥ x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a). □
6.1.2 Proof of weak Nash equilibrium. Suppose that we are given an expected allocation P computed by
Algorithm 1. Recall that NP (e ) = {i ∈ N | P (i, e ) > 0} for all e ∈ E. The condition of the following theorem is
very likely to be satisfied in practice. Note that the condition that |NP (e ) | , 1 for all e ∈ E means that for every
good, either more than one agent should compete for it or no agent at all.
Theorem 6.3. Given the solution P by Algorithm 1, if we have |NP (e ) | , 1 for all e ∈ E, then the solution P is a
weak Nash equilibrium.
(Proof) Suppose that |NP (e ) | , 1 for all e ∈ E. Recall that for each e ∈ E, t (e ) is the time when good e is exhausted
(or saturated). Also for each e ∈ E and i ∈ NP (e ), t i0 (e ) is the time when agent i starts eating good e (or the time
when e becomes the top element of current Li ).
For the solution P , if P (1,a) = 0 for some a ∈ E, shifting good a in L1 toward the end of L1 does not change the
solution P . Hence we can assume
(†) goods e with P (1, e ) > 0 appear consecutively in L1 from the top of L1.
Now suppose that for agent 1 ∈ N her preference is given by
L1 : a ≻ · · · (45)
with P (1,a) > 0 and she misreports her preference as
L¯1 : z1 ≻ · · · ≻ zs ≻ a ≻ · · · (46)
with some integer s ≥ 1. Let P¯ be the PS solution obtained under the misreport. When L1 is replaced by L¯1, we
denote t (e ) and t i0 (e ) by t¯ (e ) and t¯ i0 (e ), respectively, for all e ∈ E and i ∈ N , and also denote x∗t by x¯∗t .
Suppose that P¯1 sd-dominates P1 or is equal to P1 (i.e., P¯1 ⪰sd1 P1), where recall P¯1 = (P¯ (1, e ) | e ∈ E) and
P1 = (P (1, e ) | e ∈ E). Then it suffices to prove P¯1 = P1.
(I) Suppose that t¯ (a) > t (a). Then from Lemma 6.1 (d) and Lemma 6.2 we have
t¯ i0 (a) ≤ t i0 (a) (∀i ∈ NP (a) \ {1}), (47)
x∗t (a) (a) ≥ x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a). (48)
Now, since t¯ (a) > t (a) and NP (a) \ {1} , ∅ by the assumption, it follows from (47) and (48) that P¯ (1,a) < P (1,a),
a contradiction. Hence we have t¯ (a) ≤ t (a) and
P¯ (1,a) = t¯ (a) − (P¯ (1, z1) + · · · + P¯ (1, zs )) ≤ t (a) = P (1,a). (49)
Since from the assumption that P¯1 ⪰sd1 P1 we must have P¯ (1,a) ≥ P (1,a), it follows from (49) that
P¯ (1,a) = P (1,a), P¯ (1, z1) = · · · = P¯ (1, zs ) = 0. (50)
The latter relation in (50) implies
• elements z1, · · · , zs are saturated at time t = 0 for L¯.
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Since shifting elements z1, · · · , zs toward the end of L¯1 does not change P¯ , it suffices to consider that L1 and L¯1
are given as
L1 : a ≻ b ≻ · · · , (51)
L¯1 : a ≻ z ′1 ≻ · · · ≻ · · · ≻ z ′s ′ ≻ b ≻ · · · (52)
for some {z ′1, · · · , z ′s ′ } ⊆ E \ {a,b} with an integer s ′ ≥ 0.
(II) If P (1,b) = 0, then it easily follows from the assumption (†) that P1 = P¯1. Hence suppose P (1,b) > 0. Then by
the same arguments as in (I), using Lemma 6.2 again, we can show
(1) t¯ (b) ≤ t (b),
(2) P¯ (1,b) = P (1,b), P¯ (1, z ′1) = · · · = P¯ (1, z ′s ′ ) = 0,
(3) elements z ′1, · · · , z ′s ′ are saturated at time t = t¯ (a) (= t (a)) for L¯
and it suffices to consider the case where there is no element between a and b in L¯1.
(III) Further repeating this argument, we can show that P¯1 = P1. □
Theorem 6.3 is rephrased as follows. (Note that matrix P ∈ RN×E has the row set N and the column set E.)
• If no column of P contains exactly one non-zero entry, the extended PS solution P computed by Algorithm 1
is a weak Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.3 has very useful practical implications from the point of view of strategy-proofness. The condition
that |NP (e ) | , 1 (∀e ∈ E) is very likely to be satisfied when the number |N | of ‘agents’ is significantly large,
compared with the number |E | of ‘types of goods’ such as the assignment of students to courses.
6.2 Weak strategy-proofness in case of unit demands and matroidal supplies
We show that when the polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, the extended PS mechanism
(Algorithm 1) is weakly strategy-proof, where the matroidal {0, 1} property plays a crucial role.
Consider the random assignment problem RA = (N ,E,L = (Li | i ∈ N ),d, (E, ρ)) and suppose that the
underlying polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, i.e., d = 1. We assume that ρ (E) = |N |.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that L1 and L¯1 are given by (35) and (36) and that P (1,a) > 0. Suppose that t¯ (a) > t (a).
Then we have P¯ (1,a) ≤ P (1,a). Moreover, we have P¯ (1,a) = P (1,a) (> 0) only when P¯ (1, z1) = · · · = P¯ (1, zs ′ ) = 0.
(Proof) Because of Theorem 6.3 it suffices to consider the case where |NP (a) | = 1. Suppose that L1 and L¯1 are
given by (35) and (36) and that P (1,a) > 0.
Suppose |NP (a) | = 1, i.e., NP (a) = {a}. From Lemma 6.2 we have
P (1,a) = x∗t (a) (a) ≥ x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a) ≥ P¯ (1,a). (53)
If |N¯P¯ (a) | ≥ 2, then the last inequality in (53) should hold with strict inequality. Hence it suffices to consider the
case where |N¯P¯ (a) | = 1 = |NP (a) |. Moreover, since t¯ (a) > t (a) by the assumption, it follows from (53) that
P¯ (1, z1) + · · · + P¯ (1, zs ′ ) > 0. (54)
We show that this leads us to P¯ (1,a) < P (1,a).
Increase the values of x∗t (a) (e ) for all e ∈ sat(x¯∗t (a) ) as much as possible while keeping the vector within
P(ρ). (Here note that a < sat(x¯∗t (a) ) since t¯ (a) > t (a).) Let z
∗ be the resulting independent vector. Then, since
X ≡ sat(x¯∗t (a) ) and Z ≡ dep(x∗t (a),a) are tight for z∗, we have
z∗ (X ∪ Z ) = ρ (X ∪ Z ). (55)
Consider the following two cases (i) and (ii).
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Case (i): (Z \ {a}) \ X , ∅. In this case, it follows from (39) that
x¯ ∗¯t (a) (e ) > x¯
∗
t (a) (e ) ≥ x∗t (a) (e ) (∀e ∈ (Z \ {a}) \ X ). (56)
(Here note that for all e ∈ (Z \ {a}) \ X we have x¯∗t (a) (e ) ≥ x∗t (a) (e ) > 0, where we have x∗t (a) (e ) > 0 because of
the definition of Z = dep(x∗t (a),a), and hence e is the top element of current L
i
t of at least one agent i ∈ N \ {1}
for L¯t (as well as for Lt ) at time t = t (a).) Hence, if x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a) = x∗t (a) (a), then from (55) and (56) we have
x¯ ∗¯t (a) (X ∪ Z ) > z∗ (X ∪ Z ) = ρ (X ∪ Z ), (57)
a contradiction. We thus have P¯ (1,a) = x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a) < x
∗
t (a) (a) = P (1,a).
Case (ii): (Z \ {a}) \ X = ∅. In this case, it follows from (55) that
P (1,a) = x∗t (a) (a) = z
∗ (X ∪ {a}) − z∗ (X ) = ρ (X ∪ {a}) − ρ (X ) = 1, (58)
where note that X ∪ Z = X ∪ {a} and P (1,a) > 0. It follows from (54) that P¯ (1,a) = x¯ ∗¯t (a) (a) < 1 = P (1,a). □
It should be noted that the above proof in Case (ii) depends on the matroidal {0, 1} property.
Theorem 6.5. When the underlying polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, the extended
PS mechanism given by Algorithm 1 is weakly strategy-proof.
(Proof) The present theorem can be shown similarly as Theorem 6.3, based on Lemma 6.4. □
7 DESIGNING A LOTTERY
Now we examine how to compute an expression of the solution P , obtained by Algorithm 1, as a convex






where νk > 0 for all k ∈ K and ∑k ∈K νk = 1.
We will show that we can always compute a required convex combination representation (59) in an efficient
way (see Algorithm 2 given in Section 7.2). With the aid of polymatroidal results achieved in [8–10, 16, 24] we
can construct a lottery to attain P by finding the expression as in (59).
7.1 Computing the probability distribution
The proposed Algorithm 2 for efficiently computing an expression (59) is basically a standard procedure to obtain
an expression of a given point in a polytope P∗ by a convex combination of its extreme points10, but it is crucial
how efficiently we can compute an end point of the intersection of a line and a base polytope ([16, 24]) and can
identify the unique minimal face of P∗ containing any given point in P∗ ([10]).
Put P∗ = Conv(A). For the expected allocation matrix P (or independent flow φP ) and base x∗P ∈ B(ρ) computed
by Algorithm 1 we first consider the unique minimal face of P∗ containing φP .
10This is an adaptation of a standard procedure for finding an expression of a given point x in a relative interior of a polytope P as a convex
combination of extreme points of P . First find an extreme point y and extend a half-line from y through x as far as we reach a boundary
point z in a minimal face F (containing z) of P . Since x is expressed as a convex combination of y and z , a desired convex combination
expression can be obtained if z is expressed as a convex combination of extreme points of face F , a polytope of dimension smaller than P .
Here note that z is within the relative interior of face F because of the minimality of face F . We thus have a required algorithm.
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Denote by D (x∗P ) the set of all tight sets for x∗P in B(ρ), where D (x∗P ) is closed with respect to the binary
operations of set union and intersection and is a distributive lattice, due to Lemma 3.1 (also see [10]). Let a
maximal chain of D (x∗P ) be given by
Cˆ : Sˆ0 = ∅ ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sˆp = E. (60)
The chain of tight sets obtained during the execution of Algorithm 1 is a subchain of (60). A maximal chain Cˆ is
determined by the dependence structure associated with dep(x∗P , e ) for all e ∈ E and can be computed in strongly
polynomial time ([10]).
For each q = 1, · · · ,p consider the minor, denoted by Pq , of polymatroid (E, ρ) obtained by its restriction to Sˆq
followed by the contraction of Sˆq−1. The minor Pq is the polymatroid on Tˆq ≡ Sˆq \ Sˆq−1 with the rank function ρq
given by
ρq (X ) = ρ (X ∪ Sˆq−1) − ρ (Sˆq−1) (∀X ⊆ Tˆq ). (61)
Also denote by x∗q the restriction of x∗P to Tˆq (= Sˆq \ Sˆq−1). Then x∗q is a base of the polymatroid (Tˆq , ρq ), i.e.,
x∗q ∈ B(ρq ). Note that x∗P is a base of the direct sum ⊕pq=1Pq of minors Pq (q = 1, · · · ,p). Let ρˆ be the rank function
of polymatroid ⊕pq=1Pq . It should be noted that because of the maximality of chain Cˆ, for each q = 1, · · · ,p the
base polyhedron B(ρq ) ⊆ RTˆq is of dimension |Tˆq | − 1 and base x∗q is within the relative interior of B(ρq ) and
that x∗P is within the relative interior of the base polyhedron B(ρˆ) of ⊕pq=1Pq , which is the unique minimal face of
B(ρ) containing x∗P . (See [10, Chapter II].)
Put
Aˆ0 = {a ∈ A | φP (a) = 0}, (62)
Aˆ+ = A \ Aˆ0, (63)
Iˆ = {i ∈ N | ∂+φP (i ) = d (i )}. (64)
Then, define a face of P∗ containing φP by
P∗ (φP ) = {φ ∈ P∗ | ∀i ∈ Iˆ : ∂+φ (i ) = d (i ), ∀a ∈ Aˆ0 : φ (a) = 0, ∂−φ ∈ B(ρˆ)}. (65)
We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. The polytope P∗ (φP ) is the unique minimal face of P∗ containing φP .
(Proof) In the system of inequalities (and equations) that defines P∗, the given φP satisfies ∂+φP (i ) = d (i ) for all
i ∈ Iˆ , φP (a) = 0 for all a ∈ Aˆ0, and
∂−φP (X ) = ρ (X ) (∀X ∈ D (x∗P )), (66)
which includes all the inequalities for P∗ satisfied with equality by φP . Note that (66) is implied by
∂−φP (X ) = ρ (X ) (∀X ∈ C (x∗P )), (67)
since D (x∗P ) is a distributive lattice and ρ is modular on D (x∗P ). Also note that the system of equations (67)
together with ∂−φP ∈ B(ρ) is equivalent to ∂−φP ∈ B(ρˆ). Hence (65) defines the unique minimal face of P∗
containing φP . □
We can easily see that polytope P∗ (φP ) given by (65) is the set of feasible flows of value ρ (E) in another
independent flow network which we denote by NˆφP . Here NˆφP consists of the bipartite graph G = (S+, S−;A)
with S+ = N , S− = E, and A = N × E, a capacity function cˆ : A → R≥0 with cˆ (a) = 0 (a ∈ Aˆ0) and cˆ (a) = c (a)
(a ∈ Aˆ+), a polymatroid (E, ρˆ) on S− = E, and a polymatroid on S+ = N given by the direct sum of polymatroids
(Iˆ , ρ˜1) and (N \ Iˆ , ρ˜2) with ρ˜1 (X ) = d (X ) for X ⊆ Iˆ and ρ˜2 (X ) = min{d (X ), ρ (E) − d (Iˆ )} for X ⊆ N \ Iˆ , where Aˆ0,
Aˆ+, and Iˆ are defined by (62)–(64).
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7.2 Randomized mechanism
We begin with base x∗1 ≡ x∗P ∈ B(ρˆ) and independent flow φˆ1 ≡ φP in network NˆφP such that x∗1 = ∂−φˆ1. If φP
is already integer-valued, we are done. Hence we assume that φP is not integer-valued. Perform the following
procedure to compute an expression (59). Here recall that an N × E matrix P and a flow φP : N × E → R are
identified with each other.
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Algorithm 2: Convex Combination
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Input: A base x∗1 ≡ x∗P ∈ B(ρˆ) and a (non-integral) independent flow φˆ1 ≡ φP in NˆφP .
Output: Integer-valued feasible allocations φs for all s = 1, · · · , t + 1 and coefficients β∗s for all s = 1, · · · , t .
Step 1: Put t ← 1.
Step 2: Find an integer-valued independent flow φt in Nˆφˆt .
Step 3: Compute
β∗t = max{β > 0 | φˆt + β (φˆt − φt ) ∈ P∗ (φˆt )}. (68)
Step 4: Put φˆt+1 ← φˆt + β∗t (φˆt − φt ) and x∗t+1 ← x∗t + β∗t (x∗t − ∂−φt ).
Step 5: If flow φˆt+1 is not integer-valued, then put t ← t + 1 and go to Step 2.
Otherwise put φt+1 ← φˆt+1.
Return φs for all s = 1, · · · , t + 1 and β∗s for all s = 1, · · · , t .
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
During the execution of the above procedure, P∗ (φˆt ) appearing in (68) is the unique minimal face of P∗
containing φˆt , due to Lemma 7.1. At the t th execution of Step 3 with current rank function ρˆ we have the unique
minimal face B(ρˆ) of B(ρ) containing x∗t . Then β∗t in (68) is the maximum value of β that satisfies
∂+φˆt (i ) ≤ d (i ) (∀i ∈ N ), (69)
φˆt (a) + β (φˆt (a) − φt (a)) ≥ 0 (∀a ∈ Aˆ+t ), (70)
x∗t + β (x∗t − ∂−φt ) ∈ B(ρˆ), (71)
where Aˆ+t = {a ∈ A | φˆt (a) > 0}. Note that since φˆt is within the relative interior of P∗ (φˆt ), we get β∗t > 0. We
can compute β∗t in strongly polynomial time (due to Nagano [24] and Goemans et al. [16]) by using any strongly
polynomial submodular function minimization algorithm. Also note that the final value of t is O( |N | |E |) since
every execution of Step 3 and Step 4 makes at least one strict inequality in (69) or (70) hold with equality or
makes the length of a maximal chain C (x∗t+1) greater than that of C (x∗t ).
From the output φs for all s = 1, · · · , t + 1 and β∗s for all s = 1, · · · , t we have
φˆs+1 = (1 + β∗s )φˆs − β∗sφs (∀s = 1, · · · t ), (72)
or
φˆs = (1 + β∗s )−1 (φˆs+1 + β∗sφs ) (∀s = 1, · · · t ). (73)
Eliminating φˆs for s = 1, · · · , t and using φˆt+1 = φt+1, we can obtain the following expression.




for some convex combination coefficients νs (s = 1, · · · , t + 1). Each integer-valued flow φs gives a desired
assignment matrix Q (s ) , and νs (s = 1, · · · , t + 1) the desired probability distribution on the set of assignment
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which thus can be computed in strongly polynomial time.




Step 1: Compute P by using Algorithm 1.
Step 2: Compute an expression (59) by using Algorithm 2.
Step 3: Choose an allocation from among Q (k ) (k ∈ K ) by the lottery with the probability distribution νk (k ∈ K ).
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Consequently, we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2. By using Algorithm 1 to find the expected allocation matrix P and using Algorithm 2 to construct
a lottery realizing P , Randomized_Mechanism generates a feasible integral allocation in strongly polynomial time
whose expectation is equal to the desired solution P .
It should be noted that defining u = ⌊∂−φP ⌋ and u = ⌈∂−φP ⌉, we may replace the original base polyhedron
B(ρ) by its vector minor (the restriction by u and the contraction by u)
B(ρ)uu = {x ∈ B(ρ) | u ≤ x ≤ u}, (76)
where for any real z ⌊z⌋ and ⌈z⌉ are, respectively, the integer z∗ nearest to z satisfying z∗ ≤ z and z ≤ z∗, and for
any x ∈ RE ⌊x⌋ = (⌊x (e )⌋ | e ∈ E) and ⌈x⌉ = (⌈x (e )⌉ | e ∈ E). Also we define lower and upper capacities c and c
on arcs in A as c (a) = ⌊φP (a)⌋ and c (a) = ⌈φP (a)⌉ for all a ∈ A, and consider the independent flows with these
capacities and base polyhedron B(ρ)uu . Then, we can adapt the procedure, Algorithm 2, to the independent flow
network modified above and the obtained Q (k ) (k ∈ K ) become closer to P than those obtained for the original
network N . This may give a favorable lottery in practice, especially for a polymatroid (E, ρ) with large ρ (E) or
d (N ).
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered the random assignment problem with submodular constraints on goods and have shown the
following:
(1) Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 that the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] can
naturally be extended to give an ordinally efficient and normalized envy-free solution for polymatroidal
constraints.
(2) A sufficient condition (Theorem 6.3) that guarantees that the computed PS solution is a weak Nash
equilibrium, which is very likely to be satisfied for practical problems with a large number of agents.
(3) Weak strategy-proofness (Theorem 6.5) of the extended PSmechanism in case of unit demands andmatroidal
supplies.
In our earlier manuscript [12] we investigated the random assignment problem with matroidal constraints in
more details, where we examined a characterization of the extended PS solution by min-cost independent flows
and by lexicographic optimality, which we have omitted here.
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